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HUNGRY, HUNGRY HIPAA: WHEN PRIVACY
REGULATIONS GO TOO FAR
Meredith Kapushion*
Privacy has many different definitions ranging from informa-
tional privacy to civil libertarian ideas of personal autonomy.1 It is
difficult to define as it arises from a complex set of rules and insti-
tutions which determine the limitations and availability of informa-
tion.2 As we find new ways to harness the massive amounts of
available information, our lives may be subject to unwanted scru-
tiny and real losses stemming from privacy violations. 3 While abso-
lute privacy is unattainable, there are good reasons for pursuing
policies which might prevent the erosion of its boundaries-no
matter how gray or ill-defined those boundaries may be.4 In the
area of personal health and medical information, the sensitive na-
ture of the information at stake makes such losses all the more
perilous and potentially injurious.5
Congress, concerned with the specter of privacy violations made
possible by advances in technology and the use of electronic data
storage, enacted medical privacy regulations with the Health Insur-
* J.D. candidate, May 2005, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., Econom-
ics and Philosophy, Hillsdale College, 1999. The author acknowledges the contribu-
tions and support of Karol Boudreaux, Jay Cochran, and Susan Dudley at The
Mercatus Center, George Mason University.
1. See, e.g., Fred Cate, Principles for Protecting Privacy, 22 CATO J. 33, 34-36
(2002), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj22nl/cj22nl-4.pdf; Shaun Spen-
cer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843,
844-51 (2002).
2. See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L.
REv. 119, 123-30 (2004).
3. See generally Joy L. Pritts, Developments and Trends in the Law: Altered States:
Health Privacy Laws and the Impact of the Federal Health Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 325, 329 (2002). For a laundry list of damaging privacy
lapses, see Lois Collins, Rx for Privacy, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 2, 2001, at Al.
4. See generally Ernest Van Den Haag, On Privacy, in PRIVACY 149, 150-52 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971); Peter D. Jacobson, Medical
Records and HIPAA: Is It Too Late to Protect Privacy?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1497, 1499
(2002).
5. See, e.g., Fabio A. Sciarrino, Ferguson v. City of Charleston: "The Doctor will
See You Now, Be Sure to Bring Your Privacy Rights in With You!," 12 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTS. L. REV. 197 (2002) (discussing case involving a South Carolina hospital that
tested expectant mothers for drug use without disclosure and reported results to law
enforcement); Spencer, supra note 1, at 887 nn.246-49 and accompanying text.
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ance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"). 6
HIPAA imposes considerable regulatory burdens on health care
organizations in the hope that strict administration and control of
information will prevent both real and perceived injuries from un-
authorized and unwanted scrutiny of personal health data.7 These
concerns are by no means unfounded, but it remains to be seen
whether HIPAA's means of prevention are in fact the best cure.
Part I of this Comment traces a brief overview of the general
development and regulatory requirements of HIPAA. Part II criti-
ques HIPAA from a law and economics perspective, examining the
economics of privacy, the problematic conditions in the market for
health care services, whether HIPAA adequately addresses privacy
concerns, and the costs and consequences of HIPAA. Part III sug-
gests several alternatives for privacy advocates. In making policy
choices, the costs should be carefully weighed against the benefits,
and the outcomes should significantly solve the problems the policy
was intended to address. 8 The tradeoffs we accept in return for
greater privacy protections should reflect our individual prefer-
ences to the greatest extent possible, and the solution put into
place should have the flexibility to adjust to changing needs and
the appropriate incentives to improve over time. Ultimately,
HIPAA fails to meet these criteria, creates a number of new legal
and economic problems, and adds regulatory and financial burdens
to an already complex and costly health care system.
I. HIPAA's IMPLEMENTATION
While HIPAA's general policy goal was to protect the continuity
of employee health coverage when changing jobs,9 the primary
purpose of the privacy provisions was to address the public's con-
cern over employer access to sensitive employee medical informa-
6. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) [hereinafter HIPAA].
7. See generally Lawrence Gostin & James Hodge, The Nationalization of Health
Information Privacy Protections, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 1113, 1113-15 (2002).
8. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), amended by
Exec. Order No. 13,258, 67 Fed. Reg. 9,385 (Feb. 26, 2002).
9. HIPAA's preamble:
An Act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to improve portability
and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual mar-
kets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care
delivery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access
to long-term care services and coverage, to simplify the administration of
health insurance, and for other purposes.
HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
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tion.1° Other goals included providing additional safeguards
against third party access to "protected health information"
("PHI"),1 establishing procedures for information access, 2 and
giving patients notice and access rights to their medical
information.13
The HIPAA legislation gave Congress a self-imposed deadline of
three years to enact legislation protecting the privacy of health in-
formation.14 Congress required the privacy regulations to address
three specific areas:
1) The rights that an individual who is a subject of individually
identifiable health information should have.
2) The procedures that should be established for the exercise of
such rights.
3) The uses and disclosures of such information that should be
authorized or required. 15
In lieu of Congress meeting the deadline, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") was authorized to enact such regula-
tions. 6 Congress failed to act before the HIPAA deadline in 1999.
The HHS Secretary then undertook the task, issuing final regula-
tions in April of 2001, which went into effect on April 14, 2003.17
Small group health plans (under $5 million) were given an addi-
tional year to meet the requirements with April 16, 2004 as the
10. See generally Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infor-
mation, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (1999).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See HIPAA § 264(c)(1), Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 2033 (1996).
15. Id. § 264(b).
16. Id. § 264(a). Some legislative watchdogs claim that the timing of HIPAA com-
bined with the three year deadline was driven by political gamesmanship. Both politi-
cal parties hedged their bets that they would control the executive branch when the
deadline was expected to pass, thereby allowing them to sidestep the legislative pro-
cess in pursuit of their respective political agenda. See PRIVACILLA.ORG, HEALTH
PRIVACY IN THE HANDS OF GOVERNMENT: THE HIPAA PRIVACY REGULATION-
TROUBLED PROCESS, TROUBLING RESULTS 12 (2003), available at
http://www.privacilla.org/releases/HIPAA-Report.pdf; see also Charlotte Twight,
Medicare's Progeny: The 1996 Health Care Legislation, 2 INDEP. REV. 373, 373-74
(1998). But see Mary Grealy, Health Privacy: The Beginning of the End or the End of
the Beginning?, CATO INST. HEALTH POL'Y STUDIES CONFERENCE 79, 80 (2001) (ar-
guing that failure to meet the deadline was "due to issues like private right of action
and the rights of minors"), available at http://www.cato.org/events/transcripts/
hipaa.pdf; cf Dick Armey, Just Gotta Learn From the Wrong Things You Done, 22
CATO J. 7 (2002) ("HIPAA is a classic example of legislative panic."), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj22nl/cj22nl-2.pdf.
17. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45
C.F.R. § 164.534 (2004).
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final deadline for compliance. 8 The HHS rules regulate only cov-
ered entities-health care providers, insurers, health plans, and
clearing houses which handle individually identifiable patient infor-
mation and transmit that information electronically.1 9 The privacy
provisions, however, cover all information regardless of format.2 °
Electronic transmission is relevant only to determine whether an
organization is a covered entity;21 covered entities are liable for all
unauthorized disclosures of an individual's PHI, whether handled
electronically or not. 2
The HIPAA provisions outline a number of penalties for non-
compliance and wrongful disclosure of PHI. Disclosure penalties
range from fines of $100 to $50,000 per violation. 23 Criminal penal-
ties for violations with proven intent can include fines up to
$250,000 and ten years imprisonment.24
Citing the need for reform and improving consumer confidence
in the integrity of medical records, the regulations set forth uni-
form national standards for patient privacy protection. The evi-
dence of privacy abuse, however, was largely anecdotal in nature,
and many of the examples given were already in breach of law or
contract and could not have been remedied, regardless of the pol-
icy in place.2 5 Despite this, Congress took steps to deter potential
future violations, and HIPAA marked the first time such a baseline
national privacy standard had been promulgated.26 The rules pre-
empt state laws only to the extent that they are less prohibitive,27
and do not replace them. 8 HIPAA intentionally creates a floor,
but not a ceiling, on privacy protections in an attempt to provide
consistent restrictions on the disclosure of PHI.
18. Id.
19. Id. § 160.103.
20. Id. § 164.501.
21. See id. § 160.103; see also Jeffrey Lovitsky, Consents and Authorizations Under
HIPAA, 76 FLA. B.J. 10, 11 (2002).
22. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501, 164.502(a).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6.
24. Id.
25. See PRIVACILLA.ORG, supra note 16, at 18.
26. See Rebecca Bishop, The Final Patient Privacy Regulations Under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act-Promoting Patient Privacy or Public
Confusion?, 37 GA. L. REv. 723, 735-36 (2003).
27. See infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
28. HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 2723, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
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II. INTENT, EFFICIENCY, AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
A. The Economics of Privacy
It is difficult to treat privacy as a typical economic good. To fit
the definition of an economic good, the quantity of privacy de-
manded must exceed the quantity supplied at a price of zero.29
Simply put, if privacy were free, we would all want more. But what
does this mean in the everyday world? There is no "market" for
privacy per se,30 and as a bundle of rules and institutions that limit
the transferability of information, it is hard to think of privacy as a
"good" the way that one thinks of apples, BMWs, or financial ser-
vices as goods. Privacy is distinguished from the tangible goods
which may complement it-window shades, caller I.D., trench
coats, and fedoras-and from the substantive information it gov-
erns. The "bundle" is intangible, nontransferable, and possesses
few, if any, of the characteristics we would traditionally ascribe to
property.31
Despite fitting the model loosely, privacy is nonetheless an eco-
nomic good.32 It is scarce, that is, we generally don't want to relin-
quish control over personal information unless we get something in
return, and likewise, we would be willing to pay for more privacy
up to the point where the marginal benefits equal the marginal
costs. 33 As inapposite as it may initially seem, the metaphor of the
market applies and it is instructive to think of privacy within the
framework of supply and demand. The demand for privacy is
driven by the competing consumption interests of market partici-
pants who would prefer other rules and institutions to govern the
flow of information. Supply is similarly determined by the costs of
ensuring more privacy.34 In this context, market participants who
29. DAVID JOHNSON, PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY 26 (1991) ("[A]n economic good is one that is scarce relative to peo-
ple's wants and, thus, commands a positive price on the market.")
30. A market for privacy qua privacy does not presently exist, although markets
clearly do exist for goods and services which may give rise to greater privacy protec-
tion. Likewise, there are markets for personal information, but not for the rules and
policies that govern those markets. In other words, there is, at present, no direct
means for an individual to select or bargain for the conditions of their personal infor-
mation market.
31. See, e.g., John Gould, Privacy and the Economics of Information, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 827, 827-35 (1980).
32. See generally George Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and
Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 625 (1980).
33. See generally MURRAY ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE 241 (1962)
(explaining marginal utility and principles of exchange).
34. Stigler, supra note 32, at 628.
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value relaxed privacy protections will compete against those who
favor more stringent policies.
As a brief aside, it is relevant to note that the current tone of the
privacy debate leaves little wiggle room for those with competing
demand interests. Fred Cate notes that
[i]t is frankly difficult to find the 'other' side of the privacy de-
bate in large part because the benefits that result from open in-
formation flows (and may be placed at risk when privacy
protections interfere with those flows) are so integral a part of
our lives that they are seldom explicitly recognized or fully
understood.35
To avoid demonizing those who are "anti-privacy, '36 it is useful to
think of some of the positive effects of relaxed privacy standards
from a broader social policy standpoint. For instance, fewer re-
strictions on information allow insurance markets to operate effi-
ciently, reduce transaction costs among privacy providers, facilitate
education and research, and lower overall costs for consumers.37
These and other advantages benefit society in the aggregate and
should not be easily discounted. The effect of any given privacy
policy is to create a tradeoff between these benefits and those
gained from limiting access to information.38 Where the balance
falls will depend on how we value these tradeoffs.39 The important
thing is that we are informed as we make these decisions and con-
sider that an increase in the amount of privacy may be more harm-
ful than beneficial after a certain point.4"
Privacy also presents another problem. While there may be a
variety of options to choose from in buying any given privacy pol-
icy, the value of that policy is obscured until future valuations are
revealed. Unlike most goods, the value of privacy is difficult to
gage because damages from disclosure may be entirely unknown at
the time the policy is agreed upon or "purchased," as is the likeli-
35. Cate, supra note 1, at 36.
36. Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look at the
Costs of Privacy and the Benefits of Information Exchange, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
4, 5 (2000). "Just as no one is 'pro-abortion' or 'anti-life,' no one can be 'anti-privacy,'
yet that's the only label left by the rhetoric." Id.
37. See Stigler, supra note 32, at 628-33.
38. See generally Lawrence Gostin & James Hodge, Personal Privacy and Com-
mon Goods: A Framework for Balancing Under the National Health Information Pri-
vacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1439-42 (2002).
39. Id.
40. See infra Part II.E.
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hood of that disclosure occurring.41 Most consumers do not know
what their future medical condition will be at the time they sub-
scribe to a medical plan. They are essentially buying a "black box"
based on risk preferences and speculation about future conditions
based on limited present information. The acceptable risk of PHI
disclosure is entirely unresolved until the substance of the PHI is
known.42 Thus, the ultimate value of privacy is not revealed until
long after a policy is in place.
Despite this drawback, privacy may still be treated as an eco-
nomic good and priced as such. All time-preferenced goods in-
volve some measure of risk evaluation and speculation in pricing.43
Just as insurance policies reflect different risk preferences by offer-
ing an array of policies priced by actuarial estimates, so too can
privacy policies reflect individual preferences by following a similar
strategy. 44 One solution is to concentrate or bundle the prefer-
ences of individual consumers. This could take the form of group
policy plans, provider set standards, or some hybrid between the
two.
There is a problem, however, in that catering to individual pref-
erences can become very costly, very quickly. While it is conceiva-
ble that an individual could contract with every covered entity they
come into contact with, the costs could mushroom as providers
scrambled to accommodate a variety of needs, and regulatory over-
sight is replaced by extensive contract enforcement. This is not a
foregone conclusion, however. The incentive to develop a way to
meet the need for customized solutions while keeping costs. mini-
mized is as strong as the demand driving it. Entrepreneurs in
41. See Richard Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy: Its Intended and Unintended Conse-
quences, 22 CATO J., 13, 15 (2002) (noting that judgments are made behind a Rawisian
veil of ignorance) [hereinafter Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy], available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj22nl/cj22nl-3.pdf.
42. For example, take a patient who is diagnosed with a condition that carries a
costly social stigma. The value of keeping their medical information confidential esca-
lates in proportion to the consequences of disclosure. The patient's demand for pri-
vacy at the time of "purchase" is substantially less than at the relevant time of policy
enforcement.
43. See generally Mario Rizzo, Time in Economics, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO
AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 111 (Peter Boettke ed., 1994).
44. The mechanics may be complex, but such a system would offer a variety of
choices with greater flexibility on the part of providers and insurers, while ultimately
leaving the decision in the hands of the consumer. Ideally, an array of competing
policies would emerge to effectively meet the demands of a wide spectrum of consum-
ers. Market pressures to supply the best product at the lowest cost would also tend to
prevent unwanted information disclosures and minimize implementation and enforce-
ment costs.
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search of potential profits will search for ways to capitalize on the
potential profits and will likely find innovative solutions.45
Critics of this type of market-oriented approach point out that
this kind of price discrimination is not possible within the current
system because of "pervasive market failures. 46
Although they are correct in their assessment that the conditions
for a traditional competitive market do not presently exist, 47 it is
not a foregone conclusion that the market has failed or cannot pro-
vide an efficient outcome. Problems such as high transaction costs,
information asymmetries, and bargaining power disparities are
commonplace in the real world and many (if not all) economists
are well aware that the theoretical constraints and ceteris paribus
clauses that delimit economic models do not hold true in actual
practice. 48 Despite this, markets tend to work, even when the con-
ditions suggest the classical economics framework will have little
predictive power.4 9 Further, when particular markets are treated
within an experimental framework, economists often discover that
these discrepancies may not be problems at all.5° This is not to say
that the market always works flawlessly or that complications are
irrelevant. Without looking at the actual functions of a particular
market and at how the participants behave within the rules and
institutions that exist, it is simply inaccurate to conclude that the
underlying conditions inevitably lead to market failure or that
there are not effective measures for changing the rules of the game
in order to yield optimal outcomes.
With the advent of HIPAA, a uniform standard is imposed which
cannot adjust to individual preferences without risking liability for
45. See generally Sanford Ikeda, Market Processes 23, 23-25 in THE ELGAR COM-
PANION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (Peter Boettke ed., 1994); Israel Kirzner, Entrepre-
neurship, 103, 103-110 in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (Peter
Boettke ed., 1994).
46. See Spencer, supra note 1, at 891-907. But see JAY COCHRAN, MERCATUS
CTR., PUBLIC INTEREST COMMENT ON STANDARDS FOR PRIVACY OF INDIVIDUALLY
IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH INFORMATION 13 (2001), available at http://www.mercatus.org/
pdf/materials/78.pdf (noting that the HHS claim of market failure based on informa-
tion asymmetry and externalities presupposes poorly defined property rights).
47. See, e.g., James Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78
WASH. L. REV. 1, 59-66 (2003).
48. See Mark Pauly, Regulation of Bad Things That Almost Never Happen But
Could: HIPAA and the Individual Insurance Market, 22 CATO J. 59, 60-61 (2002) (dis-
cussing the problem of imperfect consumer information and insurance), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/j ournal/cj22nl/cj22nl-5.pdf.
49. See, e.g., Vernon Smith, Markets as Economizers of Information: Experimental
Examination of the "Hayek Hypothesis," 20 ECON. INQUIRY 167, 167 (1982).
50. See id.
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covered entities. Rather than enable more refined price discrimi-
nation by offering consumers a variety of choices priced along the
demand curve, a "one-size-fits-all" federal policy ensures that there
is no price discrimination whatsoever.5 1 Scarce resources are not
allocated according to their most valued uses, and the benefits of a
competitive market are lost to waste.5 2 HIPAA fails to match con-
sumer preferences to competing policies, and the end result is guar-
anteed inefficiency and true market failure.
To illustrate part of the problem, consider a hypothetical hospital
that caters only to patients with the lowest of privacy preferences.
Even with all patients choosing to sign authorization and consent
forms, the hospital would not escape the administrative and opera-
tive burdens that HIPAA imposes. The federal regulations man-
date that the hospital jump through every compliance hoop,
regardless of consumer preferences. 3 The patients end up bearing
the financial costs of a system that offers them little or no substan-
tial benefit.54
In the real world, preferences are rarely so uniform.55 Consum-
ers have wildly divergent preferences based on their individual
needs and tempered by the costs they are willing to bear. When
patients have heterogeneous preferences, HIPAA is only able to
cater to one segment of the market.56 The costs are not borne in
proportion to individual demand, and those with low privacy pref-
erences end up subsidizing the privacy interests of those with high
privacy preferences. 57 The net effect is a wealth transfer from the
former group to the latter.58
51. See PRIVACILLA.ORG, supra note 16, at 1.
52. For a discussion on the difficulty of obtaining market efficiency through cen-
tral or government planning, see generally RICHARD McKENZIE, COMPETING VISIONS
(1985). McKenzie notes that the "economic problem" is not simply one of scarcity,
but one of information coordination. Id. at 104-05, 108-12.
53. See generally Mary K. Martin, Some Things Old, Some Things New: The
HIPAA Health Information Privacy Regulations, 59 BENCH & B. MINN. 32, 33-34
(2002); Elizabeth Morris et al., HIPAA and Its Impact on Michigan's Health Profes-
sionals, 81 MICH. B.J. 29 (2002).
54. See, e.g., Cate, supra note 1, at 38-43 (discussing the limits of notice and con-
sent and comparing an opt-out to an opt-in rule).
55. See Richard Epstein, A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a
Naturalistic Ethic, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 665, 679 (1980).
56. See generally Gary M. Anderson, The Economic Theory of Regulation, in
THE ELGAR COMPANION TO AUSTRIAN ECONOMICs 294, 295-297 (Peter Boettke ed.,
1994). In economic terms, this is a "deadweight loss," the uncaptured wealth that
would otherwise be yielded in an efficient market.
57. See COCHRAN, supra note 46, at 5.
58. Id.
14912004]
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B. The Underlying Conditions of the Health Care Market
Stepping away from economic theory, it is useful to ask what led
to the problems associated with medical privacy and health care
providers in the first place. HIPAA was enacted to deal with the
real conflict that exists between employee privacy and employer
health care provision,5 9 but how did this conflict arise? What led to
the emergence of employer provision of health care? How did
health care shift from a simple individual "fee for services" ar-
rangement to a complex system of health plans, insurers, adminis-
trators, and federal regulation? The answer is not a simple one,
but at least part of it lies in the Internal Revenue Code and the rise
of third party payers. 60 Over time, policy changes and industry de-
velopments have shifted the role of purchasing and bargaining for
medical services away from the consumer and towards employers,
insurers, and group plan administrators.61 The tax code provides
significant incentives for employers to manage and provide medical
coverage as part of the package of benefits that employees re-
ceive. The tax burden for employer outlays is lower than if they
paid the same amount to the employee directly,63 and the resulting
shift toward employer provision of medical benefits has become so
commonplace that it is effectively mandatory in all but the lowest
compensated occupations.64
59. See generally PRIVACILLA.ORG, supra note 16, at 3.
60. Id. at 2.
61. See Victoria Craig Bruce, Medical Savings Accounts: Progress and Problems
Under HIPAA, CATO POL'Y ANALYSIS, Aug. 8, 2001, at 1, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa411.pdf.
One of the major factors driving health care costs higher has been the in-
creasing share of medical bills paid by third-party payers (private health in-
surers, employers, and government agencies) in the U.S. health care system.
Most health care consumers do not pay directly for their own health care.
Nearly 97 percent of hospital bills and more than 84 percent of physicians'
fees are paid by private health insurance. On average, 80 cents of every
dollar used to purchase health care is paid by someone other than the con-
sumer who receives the care.
Id. at 3.
62. PRIVACILLA.ORG, supra note 16, at 3; see also JOHN GOODMAN & GERALD
MUSGRAVE, NAT'L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE
COSTS WITH MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS (1992), available at
http://www.ncpa.org/pub/st/st168/; S. Butler & C. Gavora, How Tax Reforms Would
Help Improve Patient Confidentiality, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Jan. 19,
1999, at 3, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Taxesbg1242.cfm.
63. Butler & Gavora, supra note 62, at 3.
64. See generally Anne Maltz, Health Insurance 101, 690 PLI LIT. 523, 537-38
(2003).
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While it may reduce individual transaction costs to seek jobs
which bundle medical insurance with wages, this makes health ser-
vices costlier overall.65 At the margin, individuals have few incen-
tives to either engage in risk-averse behavior or to keep claim costs
low by monitoring the medical services they receive.66 Depending
on the particular type of health plan provided, employees may face
strong incentives to consume more medical services, particularly if
deductibles are low relative to individual demand and/or if individ-
ual account savings fail to roll over to successive periods. The
more an individual is insulated from the costs of their choices, the
more likely they are to spend. Thus, plans with poor incentive
structures result in greater costs overall. This free rider and collec-
tive action problem is remedied in part by the employers' interests
in keeping costs low, but this indirect bargaining and monitoring is
considerably less efficient than its direct alternative. The tradeoff
between group plan savings and losses attributable to agency
problems is complicated by tax incentives and the increasing com-
plexity of insurance and benefits plans,68 so it is unclear what the
efficient market outcome would actually look like. It is almost cer-
tain, however, that if employers were given tax neutral treatment,
third party payers would play a substantially smaller role.69
As it stands, the current system places employers in the position
of having to monitor the health services that are being provided to
their employees. Without some sort of accountability check on the
type and quality of care provided, employers have no means of
keeping insurance costs down or monitoring what exactly they are
paying for.70 This creates a real dilemma for both employers and
employees, as the tradeoff for accountability is the diminution of
medical privacy. As one policy study notes:
65. See Butler & Gavora, supra note 62, at 4.
66. See GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 62.
67. Id.
68. Consider, for example, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003 that, in subsidizing prescriptions, distances the payer from
the beneficiary thereby creating additional distortion in the health care market.
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
69. See generally M. Susan Marquis & Stephen Long, To Offer or Not to Offer:
The Role of Price in Employers' Health Insurance Decisions, 36 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 935 (2001) (study finding that employer demand for health insurance is relatively
inelastic with regards to changes in rate premiums and noting prior studies that have
found varying results for studies based on the stated preferences of employers), avail-
able at http://www.hospitalconnect.com/hsr/ArticleAbstracts/Marquis365.html.
70. See Butler & Gavora, supra note 62, at 4.
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Congress will not be able to address the privacy issue fully until
it addresses the tax treatment of employer-provided health cov-
erage. Providing tax credits directly to individuals so that they
can purchase and own their own health insurance would vastly
improve confidentiality of medical records and minimize regula-
tory intrusion into the patient-doctor relationship.7'
This and other reform solutions are well worth considering
before turning to more government regulation. If it were not for
the tax code encouraging employers to play the awkward part of
middleman in health care provision, many of the privacy concerns
that led to the HIPAA legislation may never have arisen at all. The
incidental benefit of changing the payment system to eliminate or
reduce the roll of middlemen is to reduce the demand for informa-
tion and thereby facilitate greater privacy protections.
C. HIPAA's Policy Failings
Unfortunately, HIPAA does little to address the accountability
tradeoff, and largely fails to meet its own policy goal of establishing
employer/employee privacy safeguards. Employers can effectively
sidestep HIPAA's protections because of a number of broad con-
sent exceptions7 and a lack of prohibitions on employers requiring
PHI disclosure authorizations as a condition of employment.73
71. Id.
72. See Charlotte Twight, Prying Eyes: The End of Medical Privacy (Jan. 21, 2003),
at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,76087,00.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004)
[hereinafter Twight, Prying Eyes].
73. HHS also recognizes this problem:
Jeffrey Blair: [B]ut if we go back to the original thinking of why we needed
privacy protections, if I recall correctly, the greatest concern that the public
had was that their health care information might be inappropriately accessed
by their employers. And that that might jeopardize either their ability to be
hired, or their ability to retain their employment. Of course, HIPAA at-
tempted to address this as well as it could within the framework that Con-
gress gave us.
Mark Rothstein: [H]IPAA actually does really very little, if anything to ad-
dress that problem that you referred to. That is, individuals being concerned
that their employers have access to their health records. And the reason for
that is it is lawful for an employer to require that an individual sign an au-
thorization as a condition of employment, after the individual has received a
conditional offer.
So, as a result, the disclosure of an individual's entire medical record to an
employer is lawful under HIPAA. It's illegal in California and Minnesota,
that have specific statutes that address this issue, but in the other 48 states,
it's lawful. And so, therefore, HIPAA really doesn't help things. HIPAA
will prevent the wrongful disclosure without an authorization, but as long as
there was a valid authorization signed, there would not be a problem.
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These and other exceptions may leave patients with inadequate pri-
vacy protections. Not only do the regulations open the door to the
underprotection of privacy, the penalties often encourage draco-
nian overenforcement of the regulations, in some cases, yielding
too much privacy. 4
Given the morass of regulations and accreditation requirements
that health care providers already have to contend with, it is not
surprising that when faced with uncertainty or the prospect of lia-
bility, the tendency is to err on the side of caution and overenforce-
ment.75 When the stakes are high, uncertainly is an unappealing
option, and covered entities are more likely to adopt reactionary
policies that favor their interests over those of the patients they
serve. A common example of this problem is often cited anecdot-
ally: although the HIPAA rules require hospitals to allow patients
to opt-out of the patient directory,76 many hospitals treat it as an
opt-in rule. Unless the patient explicitly authorizes the listing, hos-
pitals will not reveal that information-even in the extreme situa-
tion where an unconscious and dying patient's friends and relatives
are trying to locate her.77 While some providers may be unknow-
Meeting transcript, HHS, National Committee on Vital Health Statistics (June 24,
2003), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/030624tr.htm.
74. See, e.g., Kathleen Dracup & Christopher Bryan-Brown, Editorial, The Law of
Unintended Consequences, 13 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 97, 98 (2004). Dracup and
Bryan-Brown state:
Horror stories are appearing in the literature, warning of unintended conse-
quences. For example, a recent letter to the editor in the New England Jour-
nal of Medicine describes a situation in which a patient underwent cardiac
transplantation. Postoperatively, routine blood cultures on the patient re-
vealed a bacteremia. The infectious disease specialist at the recipient's hos-
pital contacted the donor's hospital to ascertain the identity of the infection
so that immediate antibiotic treatment could be initiated for the (now immu-
nosuppressed) patient. The donor's hospital refused to release the informa-
tion, citing HIPAA regulations and policies, because the (now deceased)
donor had not given authorization for release of PHI.
Id.
75. Id.; see also Radly Balko, The Barriers Don't Exist, TECH CEN. STATION, June
4, 2004 (discussing the reluctance of insurers to price according to individual risk
based on the false perception that federal regulations prohibit them from doing so),
available at http://www.techcentralstation.com/060404H.html.
76. 45 C.F.R. §164.510(a)(2).
77. See Laurie Tarkan, Sorry, That Information is Off Limits: A Privacy Law's
Unintended Results, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2002, at F5; see also Jack Rovner et al., Man-
aging the Privacy Challenge: Compliance with the Amended HIPAA Privacy Rule, 15
HEALTH L. 18, 28-29 (2002); Yolanda Woodlee, Hospital Bill is Family's Only Clue:
Relatives Weren't Notified of Md. Man's Hit-and-Run Death, WASH. POST, Jan. 20,
2004, at B5.
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ingly misapplying the law, many knowingly overreach for fear of
the litigation and penalties that threaten to ensue.78
In a similar vein, consent forms tend to be overbroad to avoid
potential liability."9 While HIPAA takes steps to redress this by
requiring plain language descriptions of the information and its
means of disclosure,80 it is largely ineffective given that few pa-
tients bother to read the authorization forms at all-much less in
critical detail."1 While HIPAA shifts control towards patients, this
is not clearly in their favor. They have the option to sign or not to
sign, but they lose the diversity of options they have to choose from
and may be left with a stark choice between relinquishing their pri-
vacy via a consent form or forgoing treatment altogether.
There are also numerous exceptions to the consent requirements
that are not within the patient's control.
[T]oday patient consent is not required for disclosures of your
personal medical information by covered entities in connection
with medical treatment, payment or health care operations. Al-
though patient authorization is required in certain other situa-
tions, a laundry list of over-broad exceptions retained from the
original rules largely guts the authorization requirement. 82
The gains that might initially seem to advance the interests of ar-
dent privacy advocates are quickly swallowed by this and other
problematic HIPAA rules which inadequately protect patient
privacy.83
Privacy advocates should also be concerned with HIPAA's
"transactions rule." The rule sets forth a standardized format for
medical records, 4 which allows for centralized data collection on a
scale not previously feasible. This move might bode well from a
long-run cost-efficiency perspective, but it raises serious concerns
78. See Judith Graham, Privacy Law a Bitter Pill, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 2004, at 1.
79. See Joseph Slobodzian, Judge Upholds Changes to Medical-Privacy Law, PHIL-
ADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 3, 2004, at A12 ("Patients may refuse to sign the HIPAA
form, but patient advocates argue that option is practically meaningless. Since the
rule, advocates say, most doctors or medical providers refuse to assume civil and crim-
inal liability for wrongly disclosed patient information and require patients to sign
before they provide care.").
80. See Spencer, supra note 1, at 870-71.
81. See Cate, supra note 1, at 38.
82. Twight, Prying Eyes, supra note 72.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 97-102.
84. 45 C.F.R. §162.
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for privacy.85 Consider, for example, the failed proposal to create a
National Data Center put forth by the Johnson administration .
6
What began as a proposal to consolidate agency efforts and cut
back on costs turned into a behemoth database that would track
individuals by consolidating nearly every piece of public informa-
tion available on them in one location.8 7 Following negative reac-
tions from the public and Congress, the measure was abandoned
on grounds of creating a security threat if the database were com-
promised and for putting civil liberties at risk.88 These same con-
cerns led to widespread opposition of Congress' plan to create a
National Health Identifier ("NHI") as part of the original HIPAA
legislation.8 9 These requirements were copied almost verbatim
from the rejected 1993 Clinton health security bill.90 Although the
NHI proposal was eventually withdrawn, similar threats to privacy
remain as the security requirements of HIPAA dictate a standard-
ized format for medical records, which includes Social Security
numbers. 9' In practice, if not in principle, this is essentially
equivalent to the NHI proposal.9"
D. HIPAA's Costs
In addition to the structural problems outlined above, HIPAA
also comes with a high price tag. There are direct and indirect
costs of administration, as well as a number of hidden costs in the
form of unintended consequences. Turning first to the direct costs,
even the conservative HHS .estimates are substantial. HHS esti-
mated the start up costs of compliance at $3.5 billion with contin-
ued annual costs of $1.6 billion.93 These cost estimates account for
such sunk costs as initial policy development and implementation,
renegotiation of contracts between business associates, technology
improvements, and other administrative burdens.94 Ongoing costs
85. See Charlotte Twight, Health and Human Services "Privacy" Standards: The
Coming Destruction of American Medical Privacy, 6 INDEP. REV. 485, 486-88 (2002)
[hereinafter Twight, Health and Human Services].
86. See Spencer, supra note 1, at 868.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See 64 F.R. 59,918, 59,921 (1999).
90. Twight, Health and Human Services, supra note 85, at 486.
91. Id. at 490.
92. Id. at 488.
93. See COCHRAN, supra note 46, at 3-4 (comparing HHS' estimates with indepen-
dent cost estimates of $4 billion and $1.8 billion respectively, with a total long-run cost
of roughly $30 billion).
94. Id. at 2.
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include personnel training, amendment and correction require-
ments, and patient authorizations." Combined, these expenditures
yield long-run baseline costs between $25 and $30 billion.96
Along with direct expenditures, HIPAA also adds to the costs
and inefficiencies of the health care market in the form of indirect
costs. By adding a layer of regulatory red tape, HIPAA distorts the
market process by introducing costs which disproportionately af-
fect covered entities. While the rules may be the same for every-
one, the costs of implementing them are not. Large insurance and
health care companies will gain stronger positions in the market as
they are more able to bear the costs of compliance. In contrast,
small organizations will face greater proportional costs. HHS rec-
ognized this problem and gave an additional year for small health
plans (not small providers) to comply, but this stopgap, applied
only to a fraction of affected parties, does not address the underly-
ing problem. The regulations also hinder new entrants to the mar-
ket who now face higher start up costs as a result of the compliance
requirements. These barriers to market entry make the market less
competitive overall, and as the costs of entering and remaining in
the market rise, so too do the costs of health care provision.97
Lastly, HIPAA has a number of additional hidden costs in the
form of unintended consequences. Some market players will inva-
riably profit at the expense of others when new regulatory burdens
take effect: here, there are a number of winners and losers.
HIPAA is an economic boon to the tech industry98 and to legal
firms and others that specialize in HIPAA compliance.99 Some in-
95. Id. at 3.
96. Id. at 4.
97. See Cass Sunstein, Privacy and Medicine: A Comment, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 709,
713-24 (2001).
A serious danger is that a system designed to protect privacy, even in the
way that is most sensible, might impose costs in excess of benefits, simply
because it is so hard to manage. Time and effort are scarce commodities and
far from trivial concerns. But the more important problem is that a burden-
some system for the protection of privacy could undermine patient care it-
self, not least by making it more expensive.
98. See Peter Dizikes, Tech Firms See New Medical Privacy Rules as Boon (May
10, 2001), at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/business/dailynews/medicalimagingOlO510.
html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004); Sandeep Junnarker, Law Prescribes Overhaul of Ag-
ing System, (June 16, 2003), at http://news.com.com/2030-6681_3-1001641.html?tag=
vs4_toc (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
99. See, e.g., Jessica M. Lewis, HIPAA: Demystifying the Implications for Financial
Institutions, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 141, 156 n.133 (2004) (noting that Bank One
gained a competitive edge by advertising itself as the first bank to become Claredi
certified).
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surance companies are already offering protections for liabilities
derived explicitly from HIPAA violations. 00 While this may ap-
pear to create new jobs, it is only at the expense of scarce resources
that would otherwise be put to use more efficiently elsewhere.'
The regulations also adversely affect charities and medical re-
search. Charitable organizations that raise money for health
causes depend on many former and current patients for charitable
revenues 10 2 With the advent of HIPAA, they can no longer access
or purchase targeted lists without patient consent. 10 3 This restraint
puts charities devoted to medical illness and treatment that are de-
pendent on individual donations at a significant disadvantage. 10 4
Likewise, HIPAA makes it more difficult for pharmaceutical com-
panies, medical device manufacturers, epidemiologists,' 05  and
clinical researchers to conduct clinical trials.10 6 Researchers no
longer have easy access to the medical information that allows
them to reach the relevant test subjects.0 7 This hurdle will make
the already lengthy and expensive delay between product inven-
tion and market availability even more encumbered.
Other industries may also face higher costs by virtue of falling
with the "covered entities" category, even though they are not os-
tensibly part of the health care industry. Law firms, 0 8 banks,10 9
and insurers (outside of health insurance), to name but a few, are
100. See Arnold Rosenbaum, HIPAA Liability More than Meets the Eye, HEALTH-
IT WORLD (Nov. 13, 2003), at http://www.imakenews.com/health-itworld/e-article000
200880.cfm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
101. See HENRY HAZLITT, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON 17 (3rd ed. 1978) ("The art
of economics consists in looking not merely at the immediate but at the longer effects
of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the consequences of that policy not merely
for one group but for all groups.").
102. See Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy, supra note 41, at 15-16.
103. Tarkan, supra note 81; see also John Eggertsen et al., HIPAA Privacy Regula-
tions: A Summary, SH078 ALI-ABA 29, 68 (2003).
104. Tarkan, supra note 81.
105. See American College of Epidemiology (ACE) Testimony on Impact of HIPAA
on Research, Before the Department of Health & Human Services' Nat'l Comm. on
Vital Health Stats' Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality (Nov. 20, 2003) (remarks
by Martha Linet, M.D., M.P.H., ACE President-Elect), available at
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/031120p3.htm.
106. See Lynne Glover, Conducting Clinical Trials Made More Difficult by New Pri-
vacy Regs, PIT-rSBURGH Bus. TIMES, June 6, 2003; see also Epstein, HIPAA on Pri-
vacy, supra note 41, at 18.
107. HHS has included certain exceptions for public health related activities. For a
detailed discussion, see generally Diana M. Bonti et al., The HIPAA Privacy Rule:
Reviewing the Post-Compliance Impact on Public Health Practice and Research, 31
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 70, 70-72 (2003).
108. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
109. See Lewis, supra note 99, at 141.
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among those that will face additional costs. In turn, these costs will
be transferred to consumers in the form of higher costs for legal
and banking services, and higher insurance premiums. This
"trickle down" effect is hard to trace and is unlikely to be fully
accounted for in any HIPAA cost estimate.
E. HIPAA's Legal Problems
HIPAA also raises a number of legal problems. There are tricky
issues with some of the more straightforward legal questions. For
instance, when is there a violation? When does a plaintiff have
standing, and, what are the possible remedies and defenses? In ad-
dition to these types of standard litigation questions, HIPAA raises
issues that are unique-namely, problems related to the "minimum
necessary" standard and state law preemption problems. The typi-
cal litigation problems are worth exploring, but are beyond the
scope of this paper. It is worthwhile, however, to spend some time
looking at the "minimum necessary" standard and preemption
problems as they have already generated considerable debate in
the literature and litigation in the courts.
The "minimum necessary" standard requires that a covered en-
tity make reasonable efforts to limit PHI to the minimum neces-
sary to accomplish the purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.11
This attempt to further limit the misuse of PHI creates one of the
greatest compliance challenges for covered entities."' Even for
routine and recurring disclosures or requests, covered entities must
implement policies and procedures to meet the standard.'1 2 Aside
from the implementation burden, the main problem with the stan-
dard is that it is remarkably vague. Commentators have argued
that it is "contrary to sound medical practice" and "unworkable in
daily treatment situations. 11 3 Although it has thus far survived
constitutional challenges, 4 this assurance offers little consolation
to covered entities struggling to implement the rule.115 The inher-
ent ambiguity of a "reasonableness" test combined with the near
infinite number of facts and circumstances that factor into one's
subjective judgment create a dangerous pitfall for covered entities.
110. See 45 C.F.R. §164.502.
111. Jennifer Guthrie, Time Is Running Out-The Burdens and Challenges of
HIPAA Compliance: A Look at Preemption Analysis, the 'Minimum Necessary' Stan-
dard, and the Notice of Privacy Practices, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 143, 158 (2003).
112. Id. at 160.
113. Id. at 159; see also Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy, supra note 41, at 25.
114. See S.C. Med. Ass'n v. Thompson, 327 F.3d 346, 355 (4th Cir. 2003).
115. See generally Guthrie, supra note 111, at 159-68.
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In addition to the ambiguities of the "minimum necessary" re-
quirement, HIPAA also creates state law preemption problems.116
The regulations call for federal preemption of state law except for a
number of problematic exceptions. HIPAA does not preempt state
law if the state law meets one of the following conditions:
1) Is necessary to prevent fraud and abuse;
2) Ensures appropriate State regulation of insurance and health
plans to the extent expressly authorized by statute or regulation;
3) Allows for state reporting on health care delivery or costs;
4) Serves a compelling need related to public health, safety, or
welfare, that warrants the intrusion into privacy when balanced
against the need to be served;
5) Regulates the manufacture, registration, distribution, dispens-
ing, or other control of any controlled substances, or that is
deemed a controlled substance by state law;
6) Is more stringent than the HIPAA rule;
7) Provides for the reporting of disease or injury, child abuse,
birth, or death, or for the conduct of public health surveillance,
investigation, or intervention; or
8) Requires a health plan to report, or to provide access to, in-
formation for the purpose of management audits, financial au-
dits, program monitoring and evaluation, or the licensure or
certification of facilities or individuals. 117
Although these exceptions may seem benign on the surface, they
cause considerable confusion as to when state law preempts the
federal rule.118 The issues are not straightforward or easily dis-
pensed with, and states are already seeing substantial litigation as
courts address the issue. 1 9 Until these issues are more firmly set-
tled, we can only expect more of the same.
Regardless of the wisdom behind the preemption exceptions,
much of the blame for generating this litigation falls squarely on
HHS. Presumably to cut back on compliance costs, changes were
116. See generally J.S. Christie, Jr., The HIPAA Privacy Rules From a Litigation
Perspective, 64 ALA. LAW. 126, 132 (2003).
117. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2001).
118. See generally Bishop, supra note 26, at 723.
119. See, e.g., Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709 (D. Md. 2004) (finding
preclusion where HIPAA is "more stringent" than Maryland's disclosure regulation);
Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, No. 04 C 55, 2004 WL 292079, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
6, 2004) (stating that Illinois law supercedes HIPAA where state law has more restric-
tive disclosure requirements, even with a court ordered subpoena); Lemieux v. Tan-
dem Health Care, 862 So.2d 745, 748 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting in dicta
that Florida substantive law is more stringent than HIPAA on the issue of disclosure
and thus Florida law supercedes the less protective federal regulations, even though
HIPAA's procedural requirements are more stringent).
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made to the final rule which eliminated a state's ability to seek out
an advisory opinion on preemption. 120 While this reduces the bur-
den on HHS, it fails to clarify the legal issues and merely shifts the
burden onto courts to resolve the question at the state level.
Beyond the particular legal questions engendered by HIPAA,
the regulations also invite new litigation. Although HIPAA does
not create any new federal private rights of action for wrongful
disclosures of PHI, 21 the privacy standards are now being incorpo-
rated into state common law causes of action 122 and may be used to
extend actions to parties previously exempt for lack of privity. 123
For better or worse, this expansion of state law claims adds bur-
dens to the court system and consumes legal resources.
There are also new legal costs outside of the claims themselves.
Namely, lawyers face increased discovery costs and litigation obsta-
cles in accessing medical records.1 24 Attorneys also have greater
internal compliance costs in the form of procedural safeguards for
protecting client PHI, creating and monitoring arrangements with
covered entities with respect to PHI, and in-house staff training. 125
When assessing HIPAA's legal costs, it would be a mistake to look
simply at the damages awarded to successful plaintiffs or the costs
of new claim litigation generally. The costs of HIPAA are much
broader and ought to be accounted for. Resolving legal issues as a
matter of first impression, working through more red tape during
discovery, and adding encumbrances to law firms and attorneys
must be added to the sum.
III. ALTERNATIVES
HIPAA's high costs, questionable benefits, and numerous eco-
nomic, legal, and administrative consequences make a strong case
for repeal. Not only does it seem reasonable to conclude that the
benefits fail to exceed the costs, it may be that the policy may not
120. See Guthrie, supra note 111, at 155; Brian Zoeller, Health and Human Ser-
vices' Privacy Proposal: A Failed Attempt at Health Information Privacy Protection, 40
BRANDEIS L.J. 1065, 1081 nn.90-91 and accompanying text.
121. See Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules
and the Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 618 (2002).
122. Id. at 652-58.
123. Id. at 662-65.
124. See Lori Baer & Christiana Callahan, The Impact of HIPAA Privacy Regula-
tions on Discovery of Plaintiffs' Medical Records, 12 LJN's PROD. LIAB. L. & STRAT-
EGY 1 (2003).
125. See Alexander Gareeb, Practical Implications of HIPAA, 27 L.A. LAw 12
(2004).
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produce any net benefits, regardless of cost. 126 As an alternative,
we should consider less intrusive options that address the privacy
concerns that led to HIPAA, while avoiding the many problems it
has raised. A good solution meets the criteria of sound policy im-
plementation, 127  while minimizing the regulatory costs and
burdens. 2
8
Several possible solutions have already been noted: a broad re-
examination of the structure of the health care payment system, a
revision of the tax code,'129 and the development of a privacy insur-
ance market.130 The advantage of these types of reform is that they
address certain underlying concerns of the health care market that
regulatory reform generally neglects. The agency problems, poor
incentive structures, collective action difficulties, and moral
hazards that plague the health care system are at the root of rising
costs and frustrations with medical coverage. 131 Only by changing
the rules of the game can we expect any real resolution to these
problems. But, given that such reforms would require radical
changes to the health care market and the current political climate,
more incremental change seems likely.
Another possible route is to adopt clear guidelines for better pri-
vacy policies. Fred Cate sets forth one such framework. He sug-
gests regulators "should focus on harm, not control; use narrow,
precise definitions; employ appropriate consent requirements; ap-
ply regulations consistently; and evaluate the constitutionality of
rules.' 1 32 Similarly, Cass Sunstein offers a narrower framework for
evaluating health privacy:
A free society should begin with a strong presumption in favor
of full patient control over personal information. The presump-
tion is rebutted when disclosure to others is necessary (1) for
good patient care, as in the case of consultations and medical
teams; (2) to compile information that will produce scientific or
126. See Cate, supra note 1, at 37; Mike Koetting, The Regulation of Managed Care
Organizations and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 703, 703-04,
707 (2001).
127. See supra text accompanying note 8.
128. See also Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy, supra note 41, at 22-24 (discussing the
public choice problems of HIPAA and the difficulties of reversing bureaucratic
entrenchment).
129. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
132. Cate, supra note 1, at 53.
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medical progress; (3) to protect third parties from serious risks
of harm; and (4) to prevent harm to patients themselves. 133
Whether Cate or Sunstein has the right approach is debatable,
but given the current regulatory environment and the promise of a
better alternative, it may not be a bad idea to let their ideas play
out. The current approach to privacy is muddied and simply not
feasible. A more consistent and principled approach holds the
promise of clarifying our legal rights and the value of those rights
in any given tradeoff. At least with a clear sense of what is at
stake, we can begin to make rational decisions about when, where,
and how information ought to be handled.
As a final alternative, we may simply want to go back to the
beginning. Prior to HIPAA, choices about privacy were exercised
by those closest to the situation and circumstances, namely health
care practitioners and intermediaries constrained by state privacy,
contract, and tort laws.13 4 They were also constrained by custom
and common sense, norms we too often undervalue. 35 Not every
solution to a problem need be a legal one, and the lack of wide-
spread or systematic privacy abuse prior to HIPAA suggests there
may not be a place for one. 136 Assuming, arguendo, that there is
such a place, it may be best to bolster the protections that already
exist for patient privacy at the state level, keeping in mind that
there are significant tradeoffs to enhancing those protections. 37
Regardless of which path we take, there are good reasons for
taking a more market-oriented approach. Among other things, it
offers a variety of alternatives, eliminates or reduces the overall
administrative burden, and removes the need for esoteric debates
over what amount of privacy is the "right" amount for individual
133. Sunstein, supra note 97, at 710.
134. See Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy, supra note 41, at 20.
135. Sunstein suggests physician norms may be the best place to begin. See Sun-
stein, supra note 97, at 710.
136. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
137. See Epstein, HIPAA on Privacy, supra note 41, at 14.
The former [pre-HIPAA] world should not be treated as though it were the
state of nature, in which no one knew about privacy or cared about the con-
sequences that might flow from the inopportune release of information.
Quite the opposite, the tradeoffs between the control of information and the
need for its dissemination into different arenas did not first surface in 1995
or 1996. Rather, it has long been at the center of the discussion for research
protocols used by physicians, hospitals, and research centers. The protection
of medical records was always a big deal, one that was subject to regulation
as well as contract.
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consumers. 138 Although, the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith can-
not point us to the solution, it does encourage innovation, choice,
and most of all competition. We have no guaranteed means of
knowing in advance who will win and who will lose, but it is impor-
tant to set aside any pessimism, and remember that the openness of
the market is precisely what makes it work. 39
As a corollary, it is also important to consider the benefits of
competing legal regimes. By allowing states to experiment with
different legal solutions that balance the privacy interests of con-
sumers with the interests of the health care industry, we are more
likely to see innovation and improvement. 140 State legislators can
more readily change the laws when they become ineffective or ex-
cessive, and can more readily respond to the people affected. And,
at least in principle, states can learn from each other and compare
what does or does not make a system work and adjust accordingly.
Under a uniform regime, we lose much of the incentive to create
better laws at the state level. And although HHS officials may
have the best of intentions, they face a much more difficult task in
creating rules that best satisfy the conditions of each state's inter-
ests and existing legal framework. The agency is much less likely to
finesse a solution that works for any single state, much less any
particular health care market within that state.
CONCLUSION
In sum, HIPAA is not a good deal for patients, the health care
industry, or any "covered entity" that has the misfortune to fall
within its reach. The advantages of strengthening and simplifying
the rules under a uniform standard are gained at the expense of
experimentation and competition between states and among prov-
iders. The administrative burdens HIPAA imposes are, at best, a
marginal benefit for a small segment of consumers. At its worst,
HIPAA imposes costs directly and indirectly on nearly everyone
and offers little in return. HIPAA's main agenda of resolving the
employer/employee information disclosure problem remains
138. See, e.g., Jacobson, supra note 4, at 1506; cf. Sunstein, supra note 97, at 709-10.
139. See generally FRIEDRICH HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 77-
91 (1996).
140. See generally, Bruce Kobayashi & Larry Ribstein, A Recipe for Cookies: State
Regulation of Consumer Marketing Information, at 1, 23-25, 36-38 (Prepared for the
American Enterprise Institute, Federalism Project Roundtable on Internet Privacy,
January 30, 2001) (discussing the advantages of state versus federal regulation in the
context of consumer information privacy), available at http://www.gmu.edu/depart-
ments/law/faculty/papers/docs/01-04.pdf.
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largely unresolved, and HIPAA does nothing to address the under-
lying agency problem. In place of a sound policy bolstering privacy
protections, HHS has given us a stack of regulations that amount
to a costly administrative headache with a number of wealth redis-
tributive effects in tow. Alternatively, we should repeal HIPAA
and consider less centralized, more competitive, and more effective
options.
